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1  Introduction
The formal introduction of English insurance law principles into the Cape 
and Orange Free State1 appears to have paved the way for the introduc-
tion of the rights to contribution and subrogation into South African law.2 
This introduction took place without due regard for the doctrinal bases of 
these concepts in their systems of origin.3 Contribution and subrogation still 
present our courts with difficulties, especially with regard to their respective 
areas of application and interaction. The question whether to use subroga-
tion or contribution can be crucial in a given situation, since a wrong choice 
would probably result in an insurer being non-suited.4 These difficulties are 
also exacerbated by insurers adopting standard clauses, including so-called 
“other insurance” clauses,5 which have established meanings in foreign 
jurisdictions. The impact of these “other insurance” clauses on the rights to 
contribution and subrogation has not received much attention in South African 
law. The excess “other insurance” clause, in particular, is an example of a 
clause which has escaped judicial scrutiny.6
* The valuable advice of Phillip Sutherland, Sadulla Karjiker, Jenni Darling and the anonymous reviewers 
is gratefully acknowledged
1 S 2 of the general Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879 introduced English law to regulate “every suit, action 
and cause having reference to fire, life and marine assurance”  English law thus became binding in the 
Cape Colony  The law applying in the Cape, and therefore English law, was introduced into the orange 
Free State via the General Law Amendment Ord 5 of 1902
2 In this regard see the instructive comments of Harms ADP in Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road 
Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZASCA/2008/114 html (accessed 
26-01-2009)  See also n 8
3 The generally accepted view is that the rights of contribution and subrogation in English law are based in 
equity  See also Merkin Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 8 ed (2006) 379, 414  
4 See the discussion of Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) below
5 “Other insurance” clauses govern the insurer’s relationship with the insured where another valid policy 
also covers the risk insured against  See 4 below
6 South African cases on “other insurance” clauses have focused mainly on pro rata “other insurance” 
clauses, where the existence of double insurance effectively means that the insurer will only be liable 
for its pro rata share of the insured’s loss  See Lange & Co v SA Fire & Life Assurance Co 1867 5 Searle 
358; Nathanson v Commercial Insurance Co 1886 4 SC 461  Although escape clauses have featured in 
some cases, our courts have not dealt with them specifically (see Refrigerated Trucking v Zive NO (Aegis 
Insurance Co Ltd, third party) 1996 2 SA 361 (T))
In Samancor Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd7 (“Samancor”), 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had the opportunity to assess the impact of an 
excess “other insurance” clause on the rights to contribution and subrogation. 
This article analyses the impact of excess “other insurance” clauses on the 
rights to contribution and subrogation with reference to this decision.
2  The right to subrogation
The right to subrogation was introduced into South African law in Ackerman 
v Loubser.8 In this case Ward J held that
“[an] accident policy is a contract of indemnity and from that it follows that the insurers who have 
indemnified the insured are entitled upon the principle of subrogation to the advantage of every right 
vested in the latter”.9
The above dictum sets the parameters for defining the right of subrogation. 
A workable definition is provided by davis who states that “[subrogation] 
means the substitution of one person for another, so that the person substituted 
or subrogated succeeds to the rights of the person whose place he takes”.10 
unlike English law,11 the South African application of the right to subroga-
tion has been limited to contracts of insurance.12
In the context of insurance law, the insurer, having indemnified the insured, 
steps into the shoes of the insured, succeeding to all rights and benefits the 
insured may have against the third party who caused the loss of the insured. 
The right to subrogation arises ex lege, where an insurer has indemni-
fied the insured. The right to subrogation is therefore limited to indemnity 
insurance.13
Subrogation does not effect a transfer of the insured’s rights of recourse 
against third parties.14 The claim remains that of the insured, and is brought 
by the insurer in the name of the insured. However, in Rand Mutual Assurance 
Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund,15 Harms ADP questioned the practice that the 
insurer must institute action against a third party wrongdoer in the name of 
the insured.16 He allowed the insurer to sue in its own name on the basis of 
subrogation. The judge questioned whether the rule that the insurer has to sue 
7 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA)  For a discussion of the unreported WLD decision and the SCA decision, see Van 
Niekerk 2003 Juta’s Insurance L Bul 28; Van Niekerk 2003 Juta’s Insurance L Bul 166  
8 1918 OPD 31  In Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 para 14, 
Harms ADP alludes to the fact that this introduction was the result of the General Law Amendment Act 8 
of 1879 and general Law Amendment ord 5 of 1902  The court was bound to apply English law, thereby 
introducing the right of an insurer to be subrogated to the rights of the insured
9 Ackerman v Loubser 1918 OPD 34
10 Davis Gordon and Getz’s The South African Law of Insurance 4 ed (1993) 257  
11 See McGee The Modern Law of Insurance (2001) 297
12 Subrogation is generally regarded as a naturale of the contract of insurance  See also discussion below
13 See Davis SA Law of Insurance 257
14 Reinecke, Van der Merwe, Van Niekerk & Havenga General Principles of Insurance Law (2002) para 
373
15 [2008] ZASCA 114
16 See van niekerk “Insurance Subrogation, Implied or Expressed: in the name of the Insured always” 2007 
SA Merc LJ 502. The author describes the right of the insurer to institute action in the name of the insured 
as fundamental to the right of subrogation
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in the name of the insured was in accordance with the general principles of 
our law.
Harms ADP expressed the opinion that “to require a party to litigate in the 
name of another appears to … fly in the face of the requirement of transpar-
ency that underlies all litigation.”17 The judge also pertinently stated that 
“[the] rule serves no public interest in modern times”, regarding it as “formal-
istic” and as creating anomalies.18 However, despite describing the practice 
of the insurer litigating in the name of the insured as “less than desirable”, the 
judge nevertheless refrained from abolishing the practice.19
The question whether an insurer can enforce the rights of the insured in 
its own name highlights the substantive question regarding the legal basis of 
the right of subrogation.20 However, the matter was dealt with as a question 
of procedure. Harms ADP, despite referring to an academic debate regarding 
the substantive aspects of the right to subrogation,21 chose not to enter this 
debate. He assumed that an ex lege transfer, akin to cession, does not take 
place.22
2 1  The purpose and legal basis of the right to subrogation
The purpose and legal basis for the right to subrogation is unclear. Even 
in English law there appears to be a debate as to whether it originated in 
common law or is based on equity.23 It is therefore understandable that the 
introduction of the right into another system may present the adoptive system 
with difficulties.
2 1 1  the purpose of subrogation24
It is generally accepted that the right to subrogation underpins the principle 
of indemnity.25 This explains the right of an insurer to recover any indemnity 
paid by it to the insured where the insured has also recovered damages for the 
same loss from a third party wrongdoer. Also, to prevent the insured from 
17 Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 para 23
18 Para 23  See also Moll “Die Subrogasie Leerstuk in die Versekeringsreg” 1977 TSAR 138 145, where the 
author identifies the procedural secrecy of subrogation as an inherent weakness
19 Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 para 24
20 Another substantive issue would be whether the right involves or should involve an ex lege transfer of the 
rights of the insured to the insurer in a manner akin to cession  In such a case the insurer would be able to 
institute an action in its own name  
21 Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 para 20  See also Schlemmer 
“‘n Selfstandige Reg Van Verhaal vir ’n Versekeraar gegrond op ’n Solidêre Medeskuldverhouding” 1996 
TSAR 68; Van Niekerk “Subrogation and Cession in Insurance Law: a Basic Distinction confounded” 
1998 SA Merc LJ 58; Van Niekerk 2007 SA Merc LJ 502
22 Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 para 20
23 McGee Law of Insurance 299  The author refers to two rules governing the right to subrogation  The first 
is the rule that the insurer may recover from the insured any sum which the insured recovers from a third 
party in diminution of his insured loss  The second is the rule that the insurer may require the insured to 
lend his name to an action against a third party from whom he has the opportunity to recover such sums  
The author’s contention is that the first rule has its origins in common law (see authorities cited at 301), 
while the second appears to be based in equity (see the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Morris v Ford 
Motor Co [1973] 2 All ER 1084 (CA))
24 See also Moll 1977 TSAR 140
25 Castellain v Preston (1883) QBD 380, (A) 387; Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd QB 792 (CA)  See also 
Reinecke et al General Principles para 376 and Davis SA Law of Insurance 257
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receiving double indemnity, the insurer, for its own benefit, can enforce the 
rights of the insured against a third party wrongdoer.
Subrogation is also regarded as providing the insurer with a right of 
recourse.26 This practical consequence, if not purpose, of the right to subro-
gation cannot be denied. At least against the insured, the form of subrogation 
that allows an insurer to recover from an insured who has claimed both an 
indemnity from the insurer and damages from the third party,27 could suf-
ficiently be explained as providing such an insurer with a right of recourse.
Another purpose which has been identified is that a person who has caused 
a loss should ultimately bear the responsibility for that loss.28 This reason also 
underpins the principle that an insurance payout is a res inter alios acta as far as 
the wrongdoer is concerned. The wrongdoer would thus not be able to raise the 
existence of an insurance policy as a defence to a claim brought by the insured.
All three of the above reasons appear to be of relevance to the right of 
subrogation although none of them, on their own, fully account for the right 
as such. However, whether the right to subrogation is necessary to achieve the 
above aims is doubtful. A cession of the insured’s right against a third party to 
the insurer, as well as an enrichment action by the insurer against the insured 
or the third party wrongdoer, would similarly satisfy the indemnity principle. 
Moreover, the third party wrongdoer would bear the responsibility for the loss 
it has caused, while the insurer would also have a right of recourse.29
2 1 2  the legal basis of subrogation
In English law, the basis of subrogation is unclear; whereas it is recognised 
that it at times operates by virtue of an implied term in contracts of insurance, 
it also described as an equitable remedy.30 South African law, however, does 
not traditionally recognize that equity can be the basis of a right, and has to 
identify an appropriate alternative. The general view appears to be that the 
right to subrogation is a naturale of the contract of insurance.31 This view 
poses no theoretical problem, since the mere fact that an insurance contract 
was concluded would imply the right to subrogation.
Another possibility is that the right to subrogation is an extension of 
enrichment liability.32 However, the need for the right to subrogation becomes 
questionable if one regards enrichment liability as the basis for the right. An 
insurer should simply be allowed to claim on the basis of enrichment where 
possible, rather than it forming the basis for a right to subrogation.33 Allowing 
subrogation, in addition to enrichment liability, would appear to amount to 
26 Reinecke et al General Principles para 376
27 See n 23 above
28 Reinecke et al General Principles para 376
29 Para 376  The authors argue that the principle of indemnity may be retained, without recourse to the 
doctrine of subrogation, by simply releasing the third party from liability  
30 Bank Financiere de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 475, [1999] 1 AC 221  See also n 25 above
31 See Reinecke et al General Principles para 377 and the authorities quoted there  The dictum of Ward J in 
Ackerman v Loubser 1918 OPD 31 also readily lends itself to the idea that subrogation is to be regarded as 
a naturale of a contract of indemnity insurance
32 Reinecke et al General Principles para 377
33 In this regard see Moll 1977 TSAR 147
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an unnecessary multiplication of rights and remedies. The insurer should be 
able to recover from its insured on the basis of enrichment where the latter 
has made a double recovery. The insured should similarly be able to claim 
on the basis of enrichment from a third party wrongdoer, or another party 
primarily liable to the insured, where any of such parties has benefited from 
the insurer’s payout to the insured.
Reinecke and others question whether it would be satisfactory to subject the 
insurer’s right to the “niceties” of the rules of unjustified enrichment.34 The 
authors’ main concern appears to be the possible defence by an insured that it 
has squandered the proceeds recovered from the third party. However, there 
may be a simple solution to this perceived problem.
The right of an insured to claim from a third party could be abolished by 
one stroke of the legislature’s pen.35 This has for example been done in the 
case of claims against the Road Accident Fund.36 Such a development would 
take care of the perceived problem of an insured squandering proceeds. The 
insurer will also have a direct action against a third party wrongdoer on the 
basis that the latter has been enriched at the expense of the former.37 This will 
have the added advantage of the actual wrongdoer ultimately bearing respon-
sibility for the loss it has caused. Even if this is not considered to be a viable 
option, an appropriate clause in the contract of insurance could conceivably 
afford the insurer a remedy in the event of an insured squandering proceeds 
recovered from a third party.
However, the uncertainties regarding the legal basis of the right to subroga-
tion remain. In this regard, the criticism of Harms ADP that “the rule serves 
no public purpose in modern times”38 is particularly noteworthy. Although 
the criticism pertains to the procedural aspect of an insurer instituting action 
in the name of the insured, the very need for the right to subrogation can 
similarly be criticized.
Our law is capable of addressing the purposes of the right to subrogation 
without resorting to a right to subrogation.39 In this regard, the availability 
of cession, as well as enrichment liability, would render an additional right to 
subrogation unnecessary.40
34 General Principles para 377
35 See n 31 above  The authors consider the taking away of the insured’s right against the third party as a 
way in which the indemnity principle may be maintained  However, this would also take care of the main 
concerns of the authors pertaining to enrichment liability as the basis of the right to subrogation
36 S 21 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996  See also Moll 1977 TSAR 143, who refers to Sweden as 
an example where the insured would not have a remaining claim against a third party wrongdoer after 
the former has received an indemnity from its insurer  Similarly, the insurer would not have such a right 
against the third party  Moll points out that this is an indication of how communities view the operation 
and effects of subrogation differently
37 Moll 1977 TSAR 148  The author regards subrogation as a phenomenon of the transfer of the insured’s 
rights, which would then allow the application of the condictio indebiti.
38 Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund [2008] ZASCA 114 para 18
39 See Moll 1977 TSAR 142, for his discussion on whether or not subrogation should be abrogated in our 
law  It is clear from the author’s arguments that the arguments for and against the retention of subrogation 
revolve around public policy concerns  
40 See n 39
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2 2  Subrogation and cession distinguished41
Cession involves the transfer of personal rights between a cedent (the 
insured) and cessionary (the insurer). In this manner, cession involves the 
substitution of a new creditor (the cessionary) for the original creditor (the 
cedent).42 The effect of a cession is to divest the insured of its rights against 
the third party wrongdoer with the insurer becoming the new holder of such 
rights. Unlike the right to subrogation, at least prior to Rand Mutual Assurance 
Co Ltd v Road Accident Fund,43 the insurer as cessionary will enforce the 
rights in its own name.
Subrogation, even recast as a procedural device enabling the insurer to 
enforce the insured’s rights in its own name, does not involve a transfer of the 
insured’s right of recourse against the third party wrongdoer to the insurer. 
The right remains that of the insured. In light of the availability of cession, as 
mentioned above, a right of subrogation that involves the ex lege transfer of 
the insured’s rights to the insurer would appear unnecessary.
2 3  Primary, secondary and equal and co-ordinate liability
The fact that both the insurer and the wrongdoer are debtors of the insured 
is an important issue which requires further consideration.44 Why should the 
insurer be allowed to enforce the right of the insured against another debtor? 
Apart from the principle that the wrongdoer should not derive a benefit from 
the insured’s insurance policy, and the principle that double recovery by an 
insured should be prevented, there is another possible explanation, which is 
rooted in the idea of primary and secondary liability.45
The notion of primary liability, as opposed to secondary liability, is par-
ticularly important where an insurer wishes to sue another insurer on the basis 
of subrogation. A third party wrongdoer, whether delictually or contractually 
liable, is generally regarded as having primary liability towards the insured, 
while the insurer’s liability is secondary.46 For this reason, payment by the 
insurer will not discharge the third party from liability.47 Here, the very 
existence of primary liability precludes the third party wrongdoer from being 
discharged by an insurance indemnity. Payment by the insurer is not payment 
of the third party’s obligation, but the discharge of the insurer’s own obligation 
in terms of the insurance policy.48 The insurer would, therefore, be allowed to 
bring a subrogated claim against the wrongdoer.49
41 For a comprehensive discussion of cession and subrogation, see Van Niekerk 1998 SA Merc LJ 58
42 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 463
43 [2008] ZASCA 114
44 The underlying causa of the indebtedness obviously differs  While the wrongdoer’s liability flows from 
a delict against the insured or contractual default, the insurer’s liability will be the result of its conscious 
undertaking to indemnify the insured in terms of a contract of insurance  
45 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 SCA para 5  
46 Para 5.
47 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd [2003] JOL 12391 (W) para 6  
48 Para 6
49 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 SCA para 5
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The different levels of liability appear to be the reason for the difficulties 
experienced when one insurer wishes to bring a subrogated claim against 
another insurer.50 An insurer that intends to bring a subrogated claim against 
another insurer will have to show that the latter’s liability towards the insured 
is primary to its own.51 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Samancor accepted 
that an insurer can undertake primary liability vis-à-vis another insurer cov-
ering the same loss, thereby enabling the latter to bring a subrogated claim 
against the former.52 However, should the liability of the insurers be equal or 
co-ordinate, subrogation will not be available to either of them.53 Moreover, 
payment by the one insurer will discharge the other. In this regard, contractual 
terms become singularly important in determining whether the liability of 
one insurer towards the insured is primary or secondary.54
The court in Samancor used the term “equal and co-ordinate” liability to refer 
to insurers on the same level of liability. However, the term appears to be tautol-
ogous.55 In the cases of Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications 
Plc (Scotland)56 and Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd,57 
only the word “co-ordinate” was used to describe insurers on the same level 
of liability. “Equal” and “co-ordinate” liability were used together for the first 
time in the Supreme Court of Appeal. Where the liabilities of the insurers are 
equal or co-ordinate, the right of an insurer to claim a contribution from another 
insurer also liable for the same loss comes into play.
3  The right to contribution
The right of an insurer to claim a contribution from a co-insurer liable 
for the same loss mirrors subrogation in the sense that it also does not fit 
comfortably in the generally accepted sources of liability in South African 
law. Nevertheless, like subrogation, it is well established. The right to claim a 
contribution is a right of recourse by one insurer against another insurer who 
has insured the same loss.58 The right belongs to the insurer, and it will bring 
a claim for contribution in its own name against another insurer for the latter 
to contribute proportionately.59
3 1  The basis of the right to contribution
The right of an insurer to claim a contribution from a co-insurer with equal 
or co-ordinate liability is based neither in delict nor on any contractual link 
50 Here “other insurance” clauses or the nature of the insurance policies involved could prove important  
See for example the discussion below of excess policies where the nature of the policy means that the 
underwriter will have liability secondary to that of a standard indemnity policy  
51 See discussion of Samancor in 7 below
52 Para 5  
53 Para 5
54 See the discussion of “other insurance” clauses in 4 below
55 Allen (ed) The Penguin English Dictionary 2 ed (2003) defines co-ordinate as “equal in rank, quality, or 
significance”
56 [2002] 1 All ER (Com) 321 (HL)
57 [2003] JOL 12391 (W)
58 Reinecke et al General Principles para 520
59 Para 520
EXCESS “oTHER InSuRAnCE” CLAuSES 103
between the co-insurers.60 Some American authorities suggest that it is aimed 
at preventing one insurer from profiting at the expense of another, which sug-
gests that it could be regarded as akin to enrichment liability.61 The South 
African commentators Davis,62 and Reinecke and others,63 regard the English 
case of Godin v London Assurance Co64 as the standard authority on contribu-
tion. Older South African cases similarly make reference to the Godin case.65
Reinecke and others assume that, like subrogation, “a right to contribution 
is a naturale of a contract of indemnity insurance”.66 However, this is not 
an entirely satisfactory explanation. The naturale construction of a right to 
contribution would only provide an answer if it takes the form of a term for 
the benefit of a third party. This would be the only way in which the right 
to contribution of one insurer against another could arise from the latter’s 
insurance contract with the insured. However, this construction provides for 
a contractual nexus between the insurers, which is contrary to the gener-
ally accepted view that the right to contribution is not based on any contract 
between them.67
Nevertheless the right to contribution has, through its early acceptance and 
constant use by our courts, achieved the status of an unquestioned right in 
law.68 Malan J in Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd,69 
with reference to Godin v London Assurance Co,70 accepted that the right 
to claim a contribution was founded on the principles of natural justice and 
equity. However, this cannot be the sole basis for the right to claim a contribu-
tion in South African law as equity cannot be the only basis for a right in 
South African law.
60 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 16; Reinecke et al 
General Principles para 520  See further H K C  “The Law of Contribution” The American Law Register 
(1852-1891) Vol 17 No 8 New Series Vol 8 (1869) 449 450, where it is observed that some courts of 
law have advocated “[the] idea that contribution depends upon the theory of an implied contract … ”  
Apparently, this was done more to exercise “jurisdiction, and to overcome some technical objections to 
the form of the action, than from any idea that such an implied contract actually exists” (450-451)  Valid 
arguments are raised in this article as to why contribution should not be based on an implied contract  It is 
submitted that this basis would not hold water in South Africa, where the contribution principle has never 
been viewed or advocated in this manner  
61 In the US case of Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v Maryland Casualty Co. 65 Cal  App 4th 1279, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 
296 (1998), the court described the workings of contribution in the following manner:
   “ … the aim of equitable contribution is to apportion a loss between two or more insurers who cover the 
same risk, so that each pays its fair share and one does not profit at the expense of the others” (1296)
 See also Smith & Simpson “Excess other Insurance Clauses and Contractual Indemnity Agreements 
shifting an Entire Loss to a particular Insurer” 2004 Thurgood. Marshall L Rev 215; Samancor Ltd v 
Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd [2003] JOL 12391 (W) para 11  
62 Davis SA Law of Insurance 289
63 Reinecke et al General Principles para 520
64 1758 1 Burr 489
65 See O’Flynn v Equitable Fire Insurance Co 1866 1 Roscoe 372; Lange & Co v SA Fire & Life Assurance 
Co 1867 5 Searle 358; Nathanson v Commercial Insurance Co 1886 4 SC 461  See also Samancor v Mutual 
and Federal Insurance Co Ltd [2003] JOL 12391 (W)
66 Reinecke et al General Principles para 520
67 Samancor Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 15
68 Whether or not the right to contribution was adopted from English law where equity is regarded as the 
source of contribution, its unquestioned existence in South African law is the direct result of consistent 
uniform application by our courts of law  
69 [2003] JOL 12391 (W) para 4
70 1758 1 Burr 489
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malan J also suggested that the right to claim a contribution can “’fit’ 
into our law” if the different policies can be regarded as one.71 Where the 
indemnity provided by one insurer discharges another insurer, the latter will 
be liable for a contribution based on unjustified enrichment.72 As is the case 
with subrogation, resorting to this fiction brings to the fore the possibility of 
enrichment liability. However, given that the basis of the right to contribution 
was not in issue, the judge avoided exploring this possibility further.
Perhaps the right to contribution would best be treated as a sui generis 
concept of insurance law. It is a fact that insurers fulfill an important social 
function. Therefore, one should not simply discard a principle that could 
play a role in reducing the potential economic burden on one insurer having 
to foot the whole bill where others are equally liable. Here the right to con-
tribution appears to facilitate a fair distribution of costs over the industry 
as a whole.
However, South African authors have questioned the value of the continued 
existence of this right.73 The extent to which insurers can protect themselves 
against claims for contribution by the insertion of “other insurance” clauses74 
does seem to raise questions about the necessity of affording an insurer this 
right.
3 2  Requirements for a right to contribution
Reinecke and others list the following requirements for a right to contribu-
tion to arise:75
(i) the insurer claiming contribution must have discharged its liability;
(ii) the insurer must have paid more than its rateable proportion of the 
loss;
(iii) the payment must have been in respect of an interest which is the object 
of double insurance existing at the time of the loss; and
(iv) the double insurance must have been for an amount in excess of the 
loss.
The authors appear to suggest that the commonality of the object of risk is a 
requirement for the existence of double insurance, which in turn is one of the 
requirements for a claim in contribution to arise. Davis, however, deals with 
this separate requirement for double insurance as a direct requirement for con-
tribution.76 On a practical level, though, this apparent difference would probably 
not matter as the satisfaction of the requirements for double insurance would 
partly satisfy the requirements for contribution. Ivamy adds, as a requirement 
for contribution, that a policy must not contain any stipulation by which it is 
71 Samancor v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd [2003] JOL 12391 (W) para 11
72 Para 11
73 Reinecke et al General Principles para 522  The authors question whether it is worthwhile to develop this 
branch of the law (contribution), rather than simply jettisoning the concept all together  
74 See discussion in 4 and 8 2 below
75 Reinecke et al General Principles para 521
76 Davis SA Law of Insurance 289
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excluded from contribution.77 This is an indication of the acceptance that the 
right to contribution can be varied by contractual provisions. This much also 
appears from the Samancor judgment.78 The court accepted that “indemnity 
policies may validly contain terms excluding rights of contribution”.79
The requirements for contribution as elucidated by the above authors can be 
merged into the following general statement: the right to contribution arises 
where a situation of double insurance exists and one of the insurers has paid 
more than its share of the loss. Merkin observes that the existence of double 
insurance is a matter of construction of the relevant policies.80 It thus becomes 
evident that the inclusion of “other insurance” provisions can be a determining 
factor when deciding whether or not a situation of double insurance exists.
Should the right to contribution arise between insurers, it would exclude the 
possibility of a claim for subrogation.81 However, both these rights further the 
indemnity principle in that an insured can only recover up to the extent of his 
loss. In the case of subrogation the insured’s claim against a third party is not 
extinguished, while in the case of a claim for contribution the insured, hav-
ing been indemnified, would have no remaining rights of indemnity against 
another insurer. The right to subrogation is the right of the insurer to enforce 
the insured’s claim against a third party, while the right to contribution arises 
between two insurers liable for the same loss.
Where the insured is indemnified against a loss not emanating from the 
actions of a third party against whom the insured might have had a right 
in delict or contract, subrogation would have no role to play. There would 
simply be no rights of the insured that the insurer could enforce in the name 
of the insured or, as decided in Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road 
Accident Fund,82 even in its own name. However, the right to contribution 
is not limited in this manner, as long as a situation of double insurance 
exists.
In furthering the indemnity principle, the rights to subrogation and contribu-
tion appear to be linked. However, different considerations and requirements 
underpin these two rights. The use of the appropriate clauses in a contract 
of insurance, and the proper interpretation of these clauses, can determine 
whether an insurer may bring a claim for contribution or subrogation. “Other 
insurance” clauses will usually determine which of two or more insurers’ 
liability is primary or secondary vis-à-vis the other insurer, or whether 
the insurers’ liabilities are equal and co-ordinate. This in turn determines 
whether an insurer should proceed by way of a subrogated claim, or a claim 
for contribution in its own name.
77 Ivamy General Principles of Insurance Law 6 ed (1993) 518
78 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 5
79 Para 14
80 Merkin Law of Insurance 414
81 Reinecke et al General Principles para 520
82 [2008] ZASCA 114
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4  The impact of “other insurance” clauses: subrogation or 
contribution?
“Other insurance” clauses are typically employed where the possibility of 
overlapping insurance cover exists.83 Three basic types of “other insurance” 
clauses can be distinguished.84 First, pro rata clauses restrict the liability of 
the insurer to its proportion of the loss based on the ratio between its policy 
limit and the total cover available as a result of other insurance covering the 
same risk.85 In South African law, these types of clauses have generally met 
with approval from our courts.86 Secondly, escape clauses allow the insurer 
to avoid liability completely where there are other valid and collectible insur-
ance policies.87 Thirdly, excess insurance clauses, which apply in the event of 
double or overlapping insurance, effectively only provide cover once all other 
valid and collectable insurance have been exhausted.88 These clauses all have 
the effect of excluding a situation of double insurance and, consequently, the 
right of an insurer to claim a contribution from another insurer that would 
otherwise have been liable for the same loss.
In Samancor the court had to decide whether the nominal plaintiff was non-
suited because the insurers, suing in the name of the insured, proceeded by 
way of subrogation against the respondent insurer. The existence of an excess 
“other insurance” clause and its effect on the right to claim contribution or 
subrogation was of particular importance.
5  The facts in Samancor89
The appellant insured an alternator with the respondent under a “Principal 
Controlled Construction Risks and Public Liability Insurance Policy” (the 
“works policy”). The appellant also obtained cover for the same alternator 
from Westchester Insurance Co (Pty) Ltd (“Westchester”), under an “Asset 
Insurance Policy” (the “asset policy”). The alternator was damaged and 
the appellant submitted a claim under the asset policy with Westchester. 
Westchester fully indemnified the insured for its loss.
Westchester then instituted proceedings against the respondent by way of 
a subrogation action in the name of the appellant. The respondent raised a 
special plea to the appellant’s locus standi in the court a quo, averring that 
the appellant could not seek a further indemnity from it. The respondent con-
tended that the appellant was fully indemnified under the asset policy and 
was therefore not entitled to a further indemnity from it for the same loss. 
Westchester could not invoke a right to subrogation to recover what it had 
83 See Richmond “Issues and Problems in ’Other Insurance’, Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance” 1995 
Pepp L Rev 1373
84 Baily “Competing ’Other Insurance’ Clauses under Iowa Law: a New Direction?” 1997-1998 Drake L Rev 
835  
85 837
86 Reinecke et al General Principles para 519  Also see n 6
87 Baily 1997-1998 Drake L Rev 837
88 837-838
89 The article is limited to an analysis of the decision of the SCA because it merely confirmed the findings 
of the court a quo. 
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paid to the appellant, but had to claim a contribution from the respondent in 
its own name.
The two important questions on appeal were the following. First, did 
Westchester, by indemnifying the insured, obtain a right of subrogation 
against the respondent to enforce the insured’s claim against the respondent, 
or did it have to pursue its claim against the respondent in its own name by way 
of a claim for contribution? Secondly, was the wording of the two insurance 
policies such as to create a hierarchy of primary and secondary obligations 
between the two insurers? This second question ultimately determined the 
first, and was also the question which necessitated the examination of the 
excess clause contained in the asset policy.
6  The decision in Samancor
Conradie JA referred to the established principle that a wrongdoer cannot 
resist a claim by an insurer on the basis that the insurer has indemnified the 
insured, and that payment by the insurer is res inter alios acta.90 However, 
he admitted that this was not the best way of looking at the problem. He drew 
a distinction between primary and secondary indemnification and accepted 
that a subrogation claim can be entertained where the liability of the claimant 
(insurer) is secondary to the liability of the party against whom a claim for 
indemnification is brought.91 An insurer is typically a secondary debtor and, 
upon indemnifying an insured, will have a claim against a delictual wrongdoer 
or contractual defaulter who caused the harm against which indemnification 
was obtained. Conversely, insurers as equal or co-ordinate indemnifiers would 
not be allowed to bring subrogation claims against each other.
The court accepted that an insurer could agree to become a primary indem-
nifier with other primary indemnifiers, in which case other insurers would 
have a subrogated claim against it. Westchester, therefore, accepted that it had 
to show that the liability of the respondent was not equal or co-ordinate with 
its own liability, and proceeded to set out that the respondent had, exception-
ally for an insurer, undertaken primary liability.
The court considered various clauses contained in the two policies to ascer-
tain whether, as a result of their operation, the liability of the respondent was 
primary in relation to that of Westchester. The relevant clause in the respond-
ent’s works policy, found in “Memorandum 4 – Subrogation”, provided as 
follows:
“‘ … [Notwithstanding] anything stated in the policy, … this policy shall take precedence over any 
other insurance arranged by or on behalf of the Employer. In the event of loss or damage which may 
be insured under any other policy of insurance effected by the Employer, the Insurers shall indemnify 
the Insured as if such other insurance did not exist. … [The] Insurers waive all rights of subrogation or 
action which they may have or may acquire against any of the parties comprising the Insured or their 
directors, agents or employees or their Insurers arising out of any occurrence on the Contract Site in 
respect of which any claim is admitted hereunder ….’”92
90 Para 4  
91 In this regard he referred to the speech of Lord Hoffman in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British 
Telecommunications Plc (Scotland) [2002] 1 All ER (Com) 321 (HL) para 92
92 Samancor Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 6
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The above clause, despite its peculiar phrasing, appears to be a kind of 
“other insurance” clause. Conradie JA held that if it could be shown that the 
respondents had renounced their right to subrogation, it “would go a long way 
towards showing that they are not to be regarded as secondary debtors but 
undertook primary liability”.93 However, the part of the clause providing for 
a “[waiver of] all rights of subrogation …” was applicable against an expressly 
enumerated number of parties, and the court found that there was no renuncia-
tion of the respondents’ right of subrogation generally.94 The respondent had 
thus not undertaken primary responsibility.95
The court also considered the phrases “…this policy shall take precedence 
over any other insurance arranged by or on behalf of the Employer”, and 
“the Insurers shall indemnify the Insured as if such other insurance did not 
exist”. The court found that an insured can freely choose which one of two 
co-insurers to sue, which means that each policy issued could take precedence 
over any other, depending on which one of the two insurers an insured wished 
to claim from.96 This clause was a mere confirmation of the principle that an 
insured whose risk was insured by more than one insurer could choose the 
insurer from whom it wishes to claim compensation in the absence of a clause 
in a policy that forces him to claim a pro rata portion from all insurers.97 
The appellant’s construction of the clause, that the respondent undertook to 
indemnify the insured even where it had already been indemnified by another 
insurer, was rejected. It was found to be against the rule that an insured could 
not recover more than it had lost and was thus too radical a departure from 
the common law.98 However, the clause precluded the respondent insurer from 
raising the existence of the asset policy as a defence, should a claim for indem-
nity be brought against it by the insured.
The excess clause in the asset policy read as follows:
“ ‘13. oTHER InSuRAnCES
(a)  If the Insured holds any other valid and collectable insurance or which, but for the application of 
any deductible, would have been collectable, with any other insurer covering a loss also covered 
by this policy, other than insurance that is specifically stated to be in excess of this policy or 
issued as co-insurance of any peril insured hereby, the insurance afforded by this policy shall be 
in excess of, and shall not contribute with, such other insurance.’ ”99
Conradie JA read the excess clause together with the relevant clause in the 
works policy and held that the effect of these two clauses was to place the 
works policy first in line. There was no question of the insured having to sue 
each insurer separately for its proportionate share.100 The excess clause was 
thus not a refusal to contribute to a claim paid by another insurer. However, 
it precluded the respondent from claiming a contribution from Westchester, 
93 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 8
94 Para 10
95 Para 10
96 Para 12
97 Para 12
98 Para 12
99 Para 14
100 Para 15
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while the converse would not be the case.101 The judge found that precedence 
provisions and excess-of-loss clauses determine relative contribution rights. 
They do not convert the liability of an insurer into a liability that is not equal 
and co-ordinate with that of a co-insurer.102 Therefore, a situation of double 
insurance existed and the insurers were liable as equal and co-ordinate insur-
ers.103 Westchester should thus have brought a claim for contribution against 
the respondents in their own name.
7  Discussion of the Samancor judgement
The court, by virtue of its unbalanced focus on the works policy, failed to 
give due attention to the unambiguous excess clause contained in the asset 
policy and its effect on the right to contribution. This oversight appears to be 
the root cause of the problems addressed in the ensuing sections.
Conradie JA restricted his interpretation of the relevant clauses in both poli-
cies to establishing whether or not the respondent undertook primary liability. 
The court quoted the excess clause verbatim, followed by the observation 
that the “indemnity scheme adopted by the parties is uncomplicated”.104 The 
court then reverted to a discussion of the works policy and concluded that it 
was a “first-in-line policy and not an excess policy”.105 The court reiterated 
its earlier statement, in its interpretation of the clause in the works policy, 
that there was no need for the insured “to sue each insurer separately for its 
proportionate share”.106
It is difficult to see how this conclusion follows from an interpretation of the 
wording of the excess clause in the asset policy. By repeating the arguments 
for the interpretation of the works policy clause, the court ignored the clear 
wording of the excess clause in the asset policy, which indicated an inten-
tion to make the asset policy an excess policy over other applicable policies. 
Focusing on the wording of the clause in the works policy to attribute meaning 
to the unambiguous excess clause is tantamount to preferring the respondent 
insurer’s intention over that of Westchester.107
Moreover, the court rather curiously found that the excess clause had the 
effect of excluding the respondent’s right to claim a contribution from the 
applicant, but that the converse was not the case. It is difficult to understand 
how an insurer can prevent a co-insurer from claiming a contribution from it, 
while it retains its right to contribution against the latter. This is particularly 
problematic if one considers that a claim for contribution is not based on any 
contractual relationship between the co-insurers. Ex facie the excess clause, 
Westchester limited its liability to excess cover in the event of an accidental 
overlap in coverage.108 This resulted in the underwriting of a different risk, 
101 Para 16
102 Para 16
103 Para 17
104 Para 15
105 Para 15
106 Para 12
107 See discussion of foreign case law in 8 below
108 One of the recognised functions of “other insurance” clauses  
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namely the shortfall in coverage enjoyed by the insured. Therefore, both 
insurers would be precluded from claiming a right to contribution.
The excess clause excludes policies specifically referring to it and providing 
co-insurance, and policies also expressly stating themselves to be in excess to 
the asset policy. The works policy was not one of the excluded policies, and 
the asset policy was therefore intended to provide excess cover over and above 
that provided by the former. This reading of the excess clause is not in conflict 
with the court’s interpretation of the relevant clause in the works policy which 
only served to confirm an accepted principle of insurance law.109
The court’s finding that precedence provisions and excess-of-loss clauses 
do not convert the liability of a co-insurer into liability that is not co-ordinate 
with that of another was not based on an interpretation of the excess clause 
contained in the asset policy.110 The court simply assumed a standardized 
intention behind the use of excess clauses rather than giving effect to the 
intention of the particular insurer as expressed by the clear language of the 
clause.111 This approach is contrary to the trite principle of giving effect to the 
intention of contracting parties by affording clear and unambiguous language 
its ordinary meaning.112
Moreover, in view of the conspicuous absence of South African author-
ity on the interpretation of excess “other insurance” clauses, one would have 
expected the court to follow a comparative approach.113 The proper interpre-
tation of the excess clause would have provided the court with a sound basis 
for determining whether the works policy was primary to the asset policy and, 
consequently, whether or not there was double insurance for the purpose of a 
claim for contribution by Westchester.
What then is the relationship between standard indemnity policies114 and 
excess insurance policies, and what are the implications thereof for the right to 
contribution? Are the insurers on the same level of liability which, as decided 
in Samancor, would give rise to a claim for contribution?
8  The right to contribution and excess policies
The possibility of a claim for contribution between insurers issuing excess 
insurance policies and those issuing standard policies depends on whether 
or not double insurance exists. The court in Samancor did not investigate 
the relationship between excess and standard policies. It therefore missed 
the opportunity to clarify the status of excess insurance policies relative 
to other applicable policies for the purpose of double insurance and, thus, 
contribution.
109 See n 96
110 See n 101
111 See n 106. 
112 See Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 3 SA 33 (A)
113 See Santam Bpk v CC Designing BK 1998 4 All SA 70 (C); Sikweyiya v Aegis Insurance Co Ltd 1995 4 SA 
143 (E)  The absence of a comparative approach is even more surprising in light of the wealth of decisions 
on excess “other insurance” clauses in other jurisdictions  
114 The term “standard” here refers to the main policy of insurance as opposed to excess policies that only 
apply once the standard insurance has been exhausted
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In United States jurisprudence, excess policies are generally regarded as 
providing cover which is secondary to that of standard insurance policies.115 It 
is accepted that an excess insurer does not insure the same risk as a standard 
insurer.116 A number of courts have accepted that an excess insurer does not 
have a claim for equitable contribution against an insurer with standard liabil-
ity, and vice versa.117 In Home Insurance Company v Cincinnati Insurance 
Co.118 the court found that the Home Insurance Company was not entitled to 
an equitable contribution because of its policy providing cover in excess to that 
of the Cincinnati Insurance Co. Excess insurers and standard insurers do not 
insure the same risk, given that cover under excess policies only commences 
once the cover provided by a standard policy has been exhausted.119 The court 
went so far as to suggest that even if it was accepted that the two insurers 
provided cover for the same loss, the excess insurer would be precluded from 
claiming contribution from the primary insurer. In Central Illinois Light Co 
v Home Ins Co120 the court similarly found that contribution is not applicable 
between primary and excess insurers because the policies do not cover the 
same risk.121
If these principles were to be accepted by a South African court, and it 
is submitted that they should be, then a claim for contribution would not be 
available between excess and standard insurers.
8 1  “True” excess policies and standard policies containing excess 
“other insurance” clauses
Both policies in the Samancor matter were standard indemnity policies that 
contained “other insurance” clauses. In the works policy the “other insurance” 
clause was different to those generally encountered. It merely confirmed the 
principle that an insured whose risk was insured by more than one insurer 
could choose the insurer from whom it wished to claim compensation in the 
absence of a clause in the policy that forced it to claim a pro rata portion from 
all insurers.122 In this sense, the clause was an unnecessary confirmation of 
the common law rather than a true “other insurance” clause. For practical 
purposes, the works policy was a standard policy with no “other insurance” 
clause. The asset policy contained an excess “other insurance” clause, which 
115 Smith & Simpson 2004 Thurgood Marshall L Rev 215  
116 O’Connor “Construction Law: Recent Issues in Property Coverage“ 2007 Wm Mitchell L Rev 177  United 
States and Canadian commentators and courts often use the word “primary” to refer to standard policies 
and I shall similarly use the term “primary” when quoting United States sources  
117 See Home Ins. Co. v Cincinnati Ins. Co 213 Ill 2d 307 (2004); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v Maryland 
Casualty Co. 65 Cal  App 4th 1279, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 296 (1998); National Union Fire Insurance Company 
v Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association 507 F 3d 309(5th Cir 2007); Caldwell Freight Lines Inc. v 
Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co  947 So 2d 948 (2007)
118 213 Ill 2d 307 (2004); See also Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co v Maryland Casualty Co. 65 Cal  App 4th 
1279, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 296 (1998) where the court held that there was a “general rule that there is no 
contribution between primary and excess carriers of the same insured absent a specific agreement to the 
contrary”
119 See n 130
120 213 Ill 2d 141, 290 Ill Dec  155 (2004)
121 For a discussion of the case, see Caroll & Knee “Case Law Update” 2005 DCBABR 46
122 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 12
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became operative because there was other insurance available. It could be 
argued that the cover under the asset policy was conditional upon no other 
collectable insurance being available. The asset policy thus became an excess 
policy only.
The question arises whether the asset policy should be treated in the same 
manner as a policy which, ab initio, functions as an excess policy only. This 
question becomes all the more important upon consideration of the potential 
policy issues that may arise where the insurer limits its liability in a manner 
that could possibly be detrimental to the interests of the insured.123 Excess 
policies by their very nature contemplate the existence of available standard 
insurance, which consequently result in lower premiums for the insured.124
In Samancor, the premiums charged were calculated on an assumption of 
risk that included the event for which other insurance was available. However, 
the excess clause allowed the insurer to avoid liability for any insured loss 
up to the limits of the other insurance available, even though it had received 
premiums to bear this risk. The policy issues raised by this possibility are 
profound, and it is unfortunate that the court in Samancor did not address this 
issue. The court’s failure to properly interpret the excess clause appears to 
have precluded the need to look at potential policy concerns.
With regard to the policy concerns, an important consideration would be 
whether the insured was aware of the excess clause when it concluded the 
works policy. If the insured had concluded the asset policy after the works 
policy was concluded, and assuming equal bargaining power of the parties, 
then the public policy concern would lose some of its significance. nothing 
prevents an insured from effecting cover in excess (“true” excess cover) of 
that provided by another policy and negotiating a premium that is fair in rela-
tion to the cover provided. However, it is not clear from the facts of the case 
which of the two policies was entered into first.
A policy argument similar to the above can be raised where policies con-
tain pro rata “other insurance” clauses. Where pro rata “other insurance” 
clauses are used, a premium on the potential wider liability of the insurer 
would probably be payable. However, these clauses have not posed any prob-
lems for South African courts, which have in general enforced them without 
hesitation.125 There would appear to be no reason why excess clauses should 
be treated differently. South African courts should therefore recognise the 
right of an insurer to limit its liability by the insertion of an excess clause into 
its policy.
In the United States, the difference between “true” excess policies and 
standard policies providing primary coverage but containing excess “other 
insurance” clauses, has been considered judicially. In Horace Mann Insurance 
123 Both policies could contain excess clauses, while it could also transpire that the other insurer is insolvent 
or could escape liability on some technicality
124 For a discussion of the nature and characteristics of excess insurance policies, see Horace Mann Ins. Co. 
v General Star Nat. Ins. Co 514 F 3d 327 (4th Cir  2008)
125 See O’Flynn v Equitable Fire Insurance Co 1866 1 Roscoe 372; Lange & Co v SA Fire & Life Assurance 
Co 1867 5 Searle 358; Nathanson v Commercial Insurance Co 1886 4 SC 461
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Company v General Star National Insurance Company,126 the court distin-
guished between “true” excess policies and what it termed co-incidental 
excess policies. A co-incidental policy would typically be a standard policy 
which provides primary coverage, but which in certain instances becomes 
an excess policy because of the operation of an excess “other insurance” 
clause.127 The standard policy thus functions as an excess policy as soon as 
other insurance is available.128
Where the issue of priority arises between a “true” excess policy and a co-
incidental excess policy, the categorization of the one policy as a “true” excess 
policy will settle the issue.129 The “true” excess policy will be secondary to 
the primary policy even where the primary policy purports to make itself 
secondary to other available insurance. The court made it clear that “[this] 
rule applies without regard to the terms of the policies’ ‘other-insurance’ 
clauses”130 because ‘other-insurance’ clauses are an issue only when two or 
more policies apply at the same level of coverage:
“An ‘other insurance’ dispute can only arise between carriers on the same level … it cannot arise 
between excess and primary insurers”.131
The very nature of a policy as a “true” excess policy is determinant of pri-
ority issues between itself and a co-incidental excess policy, notwithstanding 
the excess “other insurance” clause in the other policy.132
Between a “true” excess policy and a co-incidental excess policy, the former 
can never be “other available” insurance because it covers another loss entirely. 
Consequently, no claim for contribution can lie between an underwriter of a 
“true” excess policy and that of a co-incidental excess policy.133 However, in 
Samancor, this was not an issue as the works policy was neither contended to 
be nor was in fact an excess policy, be it “true” or co-incidental.
8 2  The operation and interpretation of “other insurance” clauses in 
other jurisdictions
Baily makes the claim that “most insurance policies today contain ‘other 
insurance’ clauses which are intended to dictate what is to happen in the event 
that there is more than one policy covering a single loss”.134 This contention is 
borne out by the considerable number of cases that have discussed the opera-
tion of “other insurance” clauses in various jurisdictions. Robertson similarly 
126 514 F 3d 327 (4th Cir  2008)
127 329
128 330
129 334
130 335
131 335
132 335  
133 See the analogous situation in Allstate Ins. Co v Frank B. Hall & Co of Ca 770 P 2d 1342 1347 (1989), 
where the court declined to allow pro rata contribution where two mutually repugnant “other insurance” 
clauses were at issue, because one was contained in what would otherwise be a primary policy, and the 
other in a “true” excess policy  The very nature of the one policy as a “true” excess policy was dispositive 
of the priority question
134 1997-1998 Drake L Rev 835  
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refers to the voluminous litigation on other insurance clauses.135 He notes that 
courts universally have enforced these provisions according to their terms 
where only one policy contained such a provision.136
In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v Maryland Casualty Co.137 the California 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that generally, in cases of equitable contribu-
tion, courts have heeded excess provisions in insurance contracts as long as 
the rights of the policy holder were not adversely affected. Liability would 
thus be apportioned pursuant to the “other insurance” clauses contained in 
the policies.
The “other insurance” trend has also been the subject of discussion by 
English authors, albeit to a lesser extent than in the united States. In this 
regard, Merkin refers to restrictions on double insurance effected by policy 
clauses.138 The author discusses the various guises in which these clauses may 
appear, which include clauses terminating cover under a policy in the event 
of an insured obtaining double insurance,139 and rateable proportion clauses 
limiting the insurer’s liability to its share of the insured’s loss.140 The common 
element shared by these two types of clauses is that they are triggered by the 
existence of a second valid policy providing cover for the same risk.141 The 
restriction on liability effectively removes the possibility of double insurance. 
This has been described as generally being the intention behind “other insur-
ance” clauses.142
In Family Insurance Corp. v Lombard Canada Ltd.,143 the Canadian 
Supreme Court pronounced on the interpretation and operation of “other 
insurance” provisions. The court held that one must look at the wording of 
the policies to see whether either insurer intended to limit its obligation to 
contribute, by what method and in which circumstances.144 In the absence 
of such a limiting intention, the doctrine of contribution will be applicable 
provided that the insurers’ liabilities are equal and co-ordinate.145 The court 
attempted to reconcile the “other insurance” clauses of two policies without 
preferring any one intention above the other. However, both policies contained 
excess “other insurance” provisions which, on their respective interpretations, 
would have resulted in the insured not having any cover if both were to be 
applied. The court found the two excess clauses to be mutually repugnant 
and simply followed the normal route of contribution. Moreover, the court 
135 “‘Other Insurance’ Clauses in Illinois” 1996 S IL U L J 403  The author discusses a considerable number 
of cases dealing with “other insurance” clauses  He observes that “until the middle of the 20th century … 
insurance policies had no other insurance provisions” (410)
136 403  The author refers to numerous decisions from different US states in reaching this conclusion
137 65 Cal App 4th 1279, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 296 (1998) para 10
138 Merkin Law of Insurance 410  
139 In other words, escape clauses  See 4 above
140 Rateable clauses would be similar to pro rata clauses  See 4 above  
141 Merkin Law of Insurance 410  See also North British and Mercantile Insurance Co v London, Liverpool 
and Globe Insurance Co. (1877) 5 ChD 569, where the absence of double insurance was seen as preclud-
ing the application of rateable proportion clauses
142 See Evans v Maritime Medical Care Inc 87 D L R (4th) 173 (1992); Gale v Motor Union Insurance Co. 
[1928] 1 KB 359
143 2002 SCC 48  
144 Para 28
145 Para 28
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regarded “leaving the insured without any primary coverage because of two 
excess clauses” as absurd.146
This case is also instructive on the intention of insurers where excess 
clauses are used. The court regarded the insurers’ intentions, as evidenced by 
the excess clauses, as limiting their liability “to excess coverage in the event 
that other insurance covering the same risk is available”.147 An excess clause 
shifts any primary loss to the first insurer, and makes the second insurance 
policy applicable to the extent that the insured’s loss exceeds the first policy’s 
limit.148 Where both policies contain similar, and thus irreconcilable, provi-
sions they will be regarded as cancelling each other out. Choosing one above 
the other does “violence to the intentions of the insurers and does not respect 
the obligation of both insurers to contribute”.149
In respect of litigation on the operation of “other insurance” clauses, it would 
appear as if the majority of cases have had to deal with conflicting clauses, 
which could come in a number of combinations.150 Here, United States courts 
have differed at times in their approach to the various combinations,151 while 
Canadian and English courts have been more uniform in their approach.152 
Faced with two policies containing “other insurance” clauses, the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Seagate Hotel Ltd v Simcoe & Erie General Insurance 
Co.153 found that a policy providing excess coverage was not other collectible 
insurance to a pro rata “other insurance” clause. The court specifically held 
that regard should be had to the “wording of the clauses referred to and the 
interpretation thereof”.154 Conflicting pro rata clauses and excess clauses can 
be reconciled, and the policy containing a pro rata clause would be primary 
to one containing an excess clause.155
The Canadian Supreme Court in Family Insurance Corp. v Lombard 
Canada Ltd.156 considered the approach in Seagate Hotel Ltd as correct. Any 
real conflict, however, would be resolved by simply ignoring both clauses so 
as to ensure that no prejudice attaches to the insured.157 However, where no 
146 Para 38  The court furthermore observed that its approach was endorsed by English and the majority 
of Canadian courts  English courts have indeed dealt with irreconcilable “other insurance” clauses in a 
similar fashion  In this regard see Gale v Motor Union Insurance Co. [1928] 1 KB 359, Weddell v Road 
Traffic and General Insurance Co Ltd [1932] 2 K B  563; General insurance Association Ltd v Haydon, 
[1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep  149
147 Family Insurance Corp. v Lombard Canada Ltd. 2002 SCC 48 para 35
148 See Robertson 1996 S IL U L J 432 and the authorities cited there
149 Family Insurance Corp. v Lombard Canada Ltd 2002 SCC 48 para 37  See also McGeough v Stay N Save 
Motor Inns Inc. 1994 Carswell BC 248; Honeywell, Inc. v American Motorists Insurance Co  441 n E 2d 
348 (Ill  App  CT  2d Dist  1982); Truck Insurance Exchange v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 428 n E 2d 
1183 (Ill  App  Ct  2d Dist  1981)
150 See Robertson 1996 S IL U L J 410  One could have two or more policies containing the same “other 
insurance” clauses, or different types of “other insurance” clauses that would have to be reconciled
151 See Richmond 1995 Pepp L Rev 1385  The author discusses various theories employed by courts when 
dealing with “other insurance” clauses
152 Richmond 1995 Pepp L Rev 1373; Robertson 1996 S IL U L J 403  The authors discuss a considerable 
number of cases dealing with different combinations of conflicting “other insurance” clauses and the 
ways in which US courts have dealt with them
153 (1980) 22 B C L R 374 (SC) 378
154 378
155 378
156 2002 SCC 48 para 28
157 In this respect English and Canadian law would seem to correspond
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such mutual repugnancy of clauses exists, “the process would simply be one 
of giving effect to the intent of the insurers”.158
One can distill the following general guidelines from the above cases. 
Where one policy contains an “other insurance” clause, the enforcement of 
such a clause should pose no problem. Where both policies contain “other 
insurance” clauses that can be reconciled, this should be done. Mutually 
repugnant clauses should be ignored in order to prevent the absurdity of 
“leaving the insured without any primary coverage”.159 In Samancor the court 
was faced with one excess clause contained in the asset policy, and the works 
policy containing no “other insurance” clause. Therefore, the court should 
have heeded the effect of the excess clause, namely to turn the asset policy 
into an excess policy vis-à-vis the works policy.
8 3  A comparison of excess clauses
If one considers the wording of some of the excess clauses in the above 
cases, it becomes clear that the court in Samancor, despite a lack of South 
African authority, was not dealing with anything novel. One of the excess 
clauses in Family Insurance Corp. v Lombard Canada Ltd.160 provided that
“[if] other insurance exists which applies to a loss or claim or would have applied if this policy did 
not exist, this policy will be considered excess insurance and the Insurer is not liable for any loss or 
claim until the amount of such other insurance is used up”.161
The other policy provided that
“[if] other valid and collectible insurance is available to the Insured for a loss we cover under 
Coverages A, B or D of this form, … [this] insurance is excess over other existing insurance if any, 
whether such other insurance be, primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis …”.162
In Honeywell, Inc. v American Motorists Insurance Co.163 the excess “other 
insurance” clause provided that
“[the] insurance afforded by the policy is primary insurance, except that when this insurance and any 
other valid and collectible insurance apply to the loss on the same basis, this insurance shall be excess 
of such other insurance and shall not contribute with such other insurance”.164
Miller,165 referring to the matter of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v Auto-Owners Insurance Company,166 regarded the excess clause in 
one of the policies in issue as “the usual excess clause”.167 The clause provided 
that “ … [the] insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile, 
158 See n 146  
159 See n 146
160 2002 SCC 48
161 Para 4
162 Para 4
163 441 n E 2d 348 (Ill  App  CT  2d dist  1982)
164 349
165 Miller “Automobile Insurance-Policy Construction – ‘Other Insurance clause in Primary Automobile 
Liability Insurance Policy held subservient to ‘Excess’ Clause in non-owner’s Policy – State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v Auto-Owners Insurance Company Ala , 252 So  2d 631 (1971)” 
1972 Cumb-Samford L Rev 191
166 Miller 1972 Cumb–Samford L Rev 191 provides the following reference: Ala , 252 So  2d 631 (1971)
167 191
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a trailer and a non-owned automobile shall be excess over other collectible 
insurance …”168
Despite being somewhat differently phrased, all of the aforementioned 
excess clauses seem uncannily similar to the excess clause in the asset policy. 
On a literal reading of the clauses, one would be hard pressed to argue that 
the insurers could have all intended the same result in the United States and 
Canadian courts, namely, limiting the insurer’s liability to excess cover, and 
thus excluding the right to contribution, while in Samancor they had no such 
intention.
The proper interpretation of the excess clause would have ensured that the 
correct finding was made. Westchester, its policy having become an excess 
policy by virtue of the excess clause, had no equal or co-ordinate liability 
with that of the respondent and thus, in terms of fairly uniform international 
practice, could not bring a claim for contribution against the respondent. 
Westchester should have brought a subrogated claim against the respondent.
9  Subrogation between the insurers
The court in Samancor accepted that subrogation may be available to an 
insurer against another insurer whose liabilities are not equal and co-ordinate 
to its own.169 Therefore, the fact that the works policy provided primary cover-
age vis-à-vis the asset policy should have been dispositive of the question 
whether subrogation was available to Westchester. United States commenta-
tors and courts similarly seem to regard the mere fact of one insurer having 
primary liability vis-à-vis another insurer as giving the latter a subrogated 
claim against the former.170 However, certain difficulties with this approach 
need to be noted.
Given that subrogation does not effect a transfer of the insured’s rights of 
recourse against third parties,171 the insured would not be successful with a 
claim against another insurer where it has already been indemnified. This 
would be contrary to the indemnity principle.172 The insured would have 
no remaining right of recourse against the primary insurer once it has been 
indemnified by the secondary insurer for its loss.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether an insurer that undertakes primary 
liability would still be concluding a contract of insurance.173 Should the 
insurer with secondary liability be afforded the right to proceed on the basis of 
subrogation against an insurer with primary liability, the latter’s contract with 
the insured would amount to more than a contract of indemnity. Therefore, 
the court in Samancor appears to have erred by accepting that subrogation is 
available to an insurer against another insurer who has undertaken primary 
168 191 n 2
169 Samancor Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA) para 6
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liability. This completely disregards the nature of a contract of insurance as a 
contract of indemnity.
With regard to the right of subrogation providing the insurer with a right 
of recourse,174 this right of recourse would still be limited by the extent of the 
insured’s remaining rights and remedies against a third party. Where the third 
party is a primary insurer, it would simply argue that the insured had already 
been indemnified.
The idea that a person who has caused loss to another by his unlawful 
conduct must bear the ultimate responsibility for that loss also falls short of 
providing an answer.175 The primary liability of an insurer vis-à-vis another 
can be a matter of pure co-incidence in that a second policy could contain an 
excess “other insurance” clause. This would exclude the possibility of a claim 
for contribution and enable the insurer with secondary liability to recover 
the whole of the indemnity it provided to the insured from the insurer with 
primary liability. This situation should be distinguished from one where there 
is a willing undertaking of primary liability by an insurer vis-à-vis other 
insurers.
A voluntary undertaking of primary liability by an insurer as against other 
insurers readily lends itself to the application of the res inter alios acta princi-
ple, thus allowing for subrogation between excess and primary insurers. The 
res inter alios acta principle could also aid the secondary insurer in bringing 
a subrogated claim against the primary insurer when there has been a willful 
disregard by the latter of its duties to indemnify the insured in terms of a valid 
insurance policy.
However, the res inter alios acta principle appears not to be suited to the 
situation where an insurer incurs purely accidental primary liability vis-à-vis 
another. Unlike delictual wrongdoers or contractual defaulters, the very nature 
of their business means that insurers fulfill an important and sought-after 
social function. Therefore, the position of an insurer inadvertently incurring 
primary liability should not be reduced to, or equated with, that of a delictual 
wrongdoer or contractual defaulter.
The fact that any insurer can validly limit its contribution liability does 
appear to be a moderating factor for the concern that the whole loss could be 
shifted to such an insurer without its consent. Accidental primary liability is 
reasonably foreseeable, and an insurer failing to provide for this possibility in 
its policy could be regarded as an insurer reconciling itself with the possibility 
of having to make good the entire loss of an insured. However, this argument 
is only tentatively offered and should not be extended to a general approach 
unless it can in fact be determined that an insurer has indeed reconciled itself 
174 Reinecke et al General Principles para 376  This reason appears plausible if one assumes that the pos-
sibility of the right of subrogation against third parties is taken into account by insurers when calculating 
premiums  In this regard see also Hasson “Subrogation in Insurance Law – a Critical Evaluation” 1985 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 416  The author argues that “… insurers do not seem to take subrogation 
recoveries into account when fixing premiums for their policy holders” (422)
175 For the purposes of subrogation, the social function served by subrogation (see Reinecke et al General 
Principles para 376) and the principle of res inter alios acta appear to trump the indemnity principle  
However, on a practical level, the indemnity principle is not violated because the insurer is the ultimate 
beneficiary of the right
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to this possibility in a particular situation. The principle of res inter alios acta 
could not have been designed for this type of situation and should not be used 
to determine rights to subrogation between secondary and accidental primary 
insurers.
In addition to the above considerations, the issue of Westchester being an 
excess insurer remains of importance in determining whether or not subroga-
tion is available to an insurer. Westchester was not legally liable for the loss of 
the insured up to the limit of the works policy. Should the sine causa payment 
by Westchester give rise to a subrogated claim against the respondent?
Reinecke and others suggest that subrogation should be available to an 
insurer who makes a payment in the belief that it is legally liable to make 
such payment.176 The basis for this contention is the English decision of King 
v Victoria Insurance Company Ltd.177 In this case, the court found that a third 
party who caused a loss cannot insist on “ripping up” a settlement between 
an insurer and its insured, “and on putting in a plea for the insurers which 
they [the insurers] did not think it right to put in for themselves; and all for 
the purpose of availing himself [the third party] of a highly technical rule of 
law which has no bearing upon his own wrongful act.”178 Moreover, the court 
questioned the right of a third party to deny that a payment was made in terms 
of a contract where the insurer “treats it as within the contract”.179 Where 
an insurer makes a payment in consequence “of a policy granted by [it] and 
in satisfaction of a claim by the insured”, and regards this claim as “a claim 
under the policy”, the insurer would be entitled to the “remedies available to 
the insured”.180 Therefore, the right of subrogation would be available to the 
insurer.
However, this judgment should be approached with caution. While the 
arguments of the court are logical, they appear to be based on considerations 
of what a Court of Equity would have done. In this regard merkin, commenting 
on the King case, doubts whether it sheds any light on the question whether 
subrogation is available for payments made by an insurer which is inconsistent 
with the terms of the policy.181 This would conceivably depend on the basis for 
the right of subrogation.182 Should the right to subrogation be based on equity, 
then payment would not exclude the right to subrogation.183 However, should 
the right to subrogation be the result of an implied term of the contract, then 
payment for an uninsured peril should not give rise to a claim for subrogation.184 
Such a payment would not be in terms of the contract. One needs to bear in 
mind that considerations of equity might have informed the Privy Council 
decision in King v Victoria Insurance Company Ltd.185 Therefore, the value of 
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this decision on the issue of payments not due in terms of the policy, and an 
insurer’s right of subrogation, is questionable.
In South African law the right to subrogation, if it is to be retained, and not 
to be subsumed under the law of unjustified enrichment, is best regarded as 
an implied term of the contract of insurance.186 Westchester, being an excess 
insurer, had made payment for an uninsured peril and therefore could not bring 
a subrogated claim in the name of the insured against the primary insurer. The 
payment by Westchester was a payment made sine causa, and the respondent 
was certainly enriched at its expense. Consequently, Westchester should have 
used the condictio indebiti to recover the money it had paid. However, should 
Westchester have been aware of the other available insurance, its payment 
would have been an ex gratia payment, and it would not have had any remedy 
available to recover the payment made to the insured.
Another obstacle to successful recovery using the condictio indebiti could 
be that Westchester’s mistake in making payment was not excusable.187 In 
this regard Westchester, by simply asking the insured about the availability of 
other insurance, could have ascertained that it was not legally obliged to make 
payment to the insured. Insurance policies often contain provisions requiring 
the insured to notify the insurers of the existence of other available insurance 
policies. Therefore, Westchester’s mistake appears to be inexcusable given the 
ease with which it could have determined that it was not legally liable to make 
payment to the insured.
However, the general requirement that a mistake must be excusable should 
not be extended to insurers. As mentioned, they fulfill an important social 
function. Like executors, to whom the requirement of excusable mistake does 
not apply, insurers can also be said to act for the benefit of others.188 The pay-
ment by Westchester to the insured was made for the benefit of the insured.189 
It would, therefore, be good policy to exclude insurers from the operation of 
the requirement, thereby not unnecessarily subjecting the insured to overly 
obsessive insurers trying to protect themselves against mistaken payouts.
Westchester’s summary payment of the insured’s claim is to be commended 
as the kind of approach one would ideally like to see on the part of insur-
ers. Therefore, Westchester should have made use of the condictio indebiti to 
recover the money it had paid to the insured. As mentioned before, our law has 
the necessary mechanisms to assist an insurer while at the same time uphold-
ing the indemnity principle, without resorting to the right to subrogation with 
all its concomitant legal theoretical difficulties.
10  Further comments on primary and secondary liability
In Samancor, the court’s use of the terms primary liability and second-
ary liability was not entirely satisfactory. The court accepted that “where a 
186 Reinecke et al General Principles para 377  Also see Rand Mutual Assurance Co Ltd v Road Accident 
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(primary) indemnifier happens to be an underwriter, it is in the same position 
as any other debtor” and that “[the] insurer and the wrongdoer become co-
principal debtors each primarily liable for the whole debt.”190 However, this 
cannot be an accurate description. It could be interpreted to mean that between 
an insurer undertaking primary liability on the same level as a wrongdoer and 
that wrongdoer, the possibility of a subrogated claim by the former against 
the latter is excluded. Such a construction would allow an actual wrongdoer 
to escape liability.
The fact that the court couched the concepts of primary and secondary 
liability in absolute terms failed to describe accurately the hierarchy of 
liability that exists. Relative to an insurer with secondary liability, another 
insurer might have primary liability but, as between the primary insurer and 
the wrongdoer, the liability of the primary insurer would be secondary. These 
are relative concepts that need to be understood in this manner in order to deal 
with rights to contribution and subrogation between insurers appropriately.
On the authority of Caledonia North Sea Ltd v British Telecommunications 
Plc (Scotland),191 the court found that an insurer may have a subrogated claim 
against a contractual indemnifier, provided its liability is not equal and co-
ordinate with that of the insurer.192 one contractual indemnifier might have 
secondary liability vis-à-vis another, or a wrongdoer for that matter, but may 
nevertheless be at a level of liability lower than the insurer. The contractual 
indemnifier’s liability, even if not truly primary, would not be equal and co-
ordinate with that of the insurer, whose position can almost be described as 
being on a tertiary level of liability. The court appears to have been aware of 
the possibility of more than two layers of liability but failed to articulate this 
clearly.193
11  Conclusion
In the Samancor case, the court grappled with the well established prin-
ciples of contribution and subrogation, their interaction and respective areas 
of application. The task of the court was complicated further by contractual 
provisions that were sophisticated attempts to escape the confines of principle. 
The difficulties experienced with these adopted principles seem unnecessary 
in view of the readily available mechanisms in South African law that can 
serve the needs of insurance law. The appropriate enrichment action would 
provide the insurer with a direct right of recourse against a wrongdoer, or 
against another insurer that has undertaken primary liability for the same 
loss. The only proviso would be that an insured, having been indemnified 
by its insurer, should not have any remaining rights of recourse against the 
wrongdoer.
Giving a direct enrichment claim to the insurer against a third party wrong-
doer, or a party with primary liability vis-à-vis its own, will also ensure that 
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the loss is borne by such a wrongdoer or party with primary liability. There 
would consequently be no need to retain the principle of res inter alios acta in 
order to explain the right of an insurer to claim in the name of the insured.
The right of contribution, however, could serve the useful function of 
spreading costs over the insurance industry as a whole. The ease with which 
insurers could exclude the operation of contribution with the appropriate 
clauses acts as the appropriate counterweight. In the absence of such clauses, 
the right to claim contribution should be regarded as sui generis to insurance 
law and it should be maintained.
However, “other insurance” clauses, as an expression of intent, should be 
honoured by our courts. The insufficient appreciation of the content and mean-
ing of the excess clause in Samancor can be attributed to its virtual absence 
from South African jurisprudence, and the court’s understandable preoccupa-
tion with concepts in need of sound legal theoretical foundations. The court, 
consequently, allowed the clear and unambiguously expressed intention of an 
insurer to go unnoticed.
SUMMARY
Insurers typically insert “other insurance” clauses in order to specify how their policies should 
interact with other policies covering the same risk. This enables insurers to avoid situations of double 
insurance and, consequently, claims for contribution by co-insurers. Although it is standard practice 
in the South African insurance industry to insert “other insurance” clauses into contracts, their func-
tioning has been neglected in the legal literature. This article aims at increasing the understanding of 
these clauses through evaluating the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Samancor v Mutual 
and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2005 4 SA 40 (SCA)
In Samancor the opportunity existed to consider and develop the law regarding the impact of 
“other insurance” clauses on the rights to contribution and subrogation. Unfortunately, the court failed 
to use this opportunity, since it ignored an “other insurance” clause which allowed for the policy 
containing it to become an excess policy to other policies covering the same risk. The court failed to 
entertain the possibility that the “other insurance” clause could have this effect. The oversight appears 
to be the result of the context within which “other insurance” clauses occur. They operate within the 
context of rights to contribution and subrogation, which were adopted from English law without due 
regard to their doctrinal bases. The court’s preoccupation with the concepts themselves resulted in the 
intention of the insurer, as clearly expressed in the “other insurance” clause, going unnoticed.
The conclusion is reached that it has to be re-examined whether there is any need for recognizing 
rights to subrogation and contribution. It is argued that the South African law of unjustified enrich-
ment and the mechanism of cession make a separate right to subrogation superfluous. However, good 
policy reasons exist for the retention of the right to contribution.
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